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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This being an appeal from an order denying a motion for a
new trial and denial of a motion for continuance of the trial in the
Seventh Judicial District Court, the Supreme Court is granted
original appellate jurisdiction over this case by Section 78-2-2(j)
U.C.A. (1953, as amended) subject to referral to the Court of
Appeals.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
FIRST ISSUE: Whether the Court's denial of Appellant's
motion, made at the beginning of the trial, for a continuance of the
trial to allow Appellant to subpoena a witness was a denial of
Appellant's right of due process of law.
Standard of Appellate Review: The Trial Court's ruling is
based upon the Court's discretion to grant or deny motions pursuant
to Rule 4-105(3) of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration. Any
decision is at the discretion of the Trial Court, and the Appeals Court
should not disturb the Trial Court's ruling without a showing of an
abuse of discretion.
SECOND ISSUE: Whether Appellant's Motion for a new
trial complied with the requirements of Rule 59(a), Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.

1
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Standard of Review: The Trial Court has no discretion to
grant a new trial absent a showing of one of the grounds specified in
Rule 59(a). Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84 (Utah Ct App 1989).
If a showing of one of the grounds specified in the Rule is made, the
court still has broad discretion to grant or deny a motion for a new
trial and the Appeals Court will not disturb the Trial Court's decision
absent a showing of an abuse of discretion. Crookston v. Fire Ins.
Exch., 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991).
THIRD ISSUE: Whether the damages awarded to the
Plaintiff are beyond the ability of the Defendant to pay. Appellant
stated that as one of his grounds for a motion for a new trial. The law
suit did not seek damages, and the court did not award "damages",
but awarded Appellee compensation for goods and services provided
to Defendant. The court found that this issue was a restatement of
Defendant's claim that he was denied his right to due process
because the court refused to continue the trial.
Standard of Appellate Review. Pursuant to Rule 59(a)5,
Appellant must show the Court awarded "damages", the damages
were exclusive, and appear to have been given under the influence of
passion or prejudice. The Trial Court's refusal to grant a new trial on
this basis came from the Court's review of the facts and the Court's

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
2 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

decision should not be set aside without a showing of an abuse of the
Court's discretion. Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84 (Utah Ct App
1989).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND RULES
Constitution of Utah, Article 1, Section 7. Due Process of Law.
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law.
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a) 1 through 7. also (b) and (c)
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be
granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for
any of the following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for
a new trial in an action tried without a jury, the court may open the
judgment if one has been entered, take additional testimony, amend
findings of fact and conclusions of law or make new findings and
conclusions, and direct the entry of a new judgment;
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse
party, or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which
either party was prevented from having a fair trial.
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of
the jurors have been induced to assent to any general or special

3
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verdict, or to a finding on any question submitted to them by the
court, by resort to a determination by chance or as a result of bribery,
such misconduct may be proved by the affidavit of any one of the
jurors.
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not
have guarded against.
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making
the application, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have
discovered and produced at the trial.
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been
given under the influence of passion or prejudice.
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other
decision, or that it is against law.
(7) Error in law.
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be
served not later than 10 day after the entry of the judgment.
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a
new trial is made under Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be
supported by affidavit....
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 45(a)(1)(C)
Subpoena.
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(a) Form; issuance.
(1) Every subpoena shall:
(C) command each person to whom it is directed to appear
to give testimony at trial, or at hearing, or at deposition, or to
produce or to permit inspection any copying of documents or
tangible things in the possession, custody or control of that person,
or to permit inspection of premises, at a time and place therein
specified; and
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 45(b)(1)(A)
(b) Service; scope.
(1) Generally.
(A) A subpoena may be served by any person who is not a party and
is not less than 18 years of age. Service of a subpoena upon a person
named therein shall be made as provided in Rule 4(e) for the service
of process and, if the person's appearance is commanded, by
tendering to that person the fees for one day's attendance and the
mileage allowed by law. When the subpoena is issued on behalf of
the United States, or this state, or any officer or agency of either, fees
and mileage need not be tendered. Prior notice of any commanded
production or inspection of documents or tangible things or

5
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inspection of premises before trial shall be served on each party in
the manner prescribed by Rule 5(b).
Utah Code Annotated (1953) Section 78-24-5
Subpoena defined. The process by which the attendance of a
witness is required is a subpoena. It is a writ or order directed to a
person and requiring his attendance at a particular time and place to
testify as a witness. It may also require him to bring with him any
books, documents or other things under his control which he is
bound by law to produce in evidence.
U.C.A. Section 78-24-6
Duty of witness served with subpoena. A witness served with
a subpoena must attend at the time appointed with any papers under
his control required by the subpoena, and answer all pertinent and
legal questions; and, unless soon discharged, must remain until the
testimony is closed.
Utah Rules of Judicial Administration, Rule 4-105(3)
Continuances in special circumstances.
(3) A motion to continue made on or within 10 days
prior to the date of a hearing may be granted by the court upon a
showing of good cause and upon such conditions as the court
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determines to be just, including but not limited to the payment of
costs and attorney fees.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. NATURE OF THE CASE. This is a civil action originally
brought in the Seventh Judicial District Court for Carbon County,
State of Utah. Plaintiff/Appellee, a Utah Corporation, filed an action
for

payment

for

goods

and

services

provided

to

Defendant/Appellant, for the repair and re-building of Appellant's
automobile.

The court ruled in favor of Appellee, issued a

Memorandum Decision and directed Appellee's attorney to prepare
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and an Order of Judgment.
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, In 1999, Appellant arranged
with Appellee to repair and rebuild automobiles owned by Appellant.
Appellant delivered his automobile to Appellee's place of business
and discussed the work he required to be done by Appellee's
employees. Appellant reached an agreement with Appellee's
president, but thereafter, Appellant also gave additional instruction
to Appellee's office manager and Appellee's mechanics for the
performance of additional work. (para. 5, Verified Complaint and
para. 1, Answer to Complaint).

7
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A few months later, when Appellee had completed most of
the restoration, without Appellee's consent and during a day when
Appellee was not open for business, Appellant went to Appellee's
place of business and removed his automobile from the premises
without Appellee's consent and without paying for the goods and
services, (para. 7, Verified Complaint, uncontroverted by Answer to
Complaint). Appellee requested payment and Appellant refused.
Appellee filed suit in the Seventh Judicial District Court for Carbon
County, State of Utah and served Appellant with a Complaint and
Summons. Appellant answered the Complaint and Summons and
filed various pleadings in an effort to get the matter dismissed. On
February 17, 2000, Appellant obtained a subpoena form, filled it out
and delivered it to the sheriff of Carbon County to be served upon
the president of Appellee, Paul Pugliese. On February 18, 2000, the
Carbon County Sheriff served Paul Pugliese with the subpoena. The
subpoena did not state a specific place, day and time for appearance
and in fact, was issued four months prior to June 26, 2000, the day
the District Court judge issued a Notice of Trial Setting, for the trial
to be held on September 7, 2000. (Ruling on Defendant's Motion for
Stay of Order and Motion for New Trial, Feb. 6, 2000, page 2, 1st

8
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paragraph). Appellant also failed to include the witness fee required
by the Rules of Civil Procedure.
Paul Pugliese did not appear for trial, and Appellant made a
motion on the morning of trial for a continuance to subpoena Mr.
Pugliese. The Court exercising its discretion, denied Appellant's
motion and proceeded to trial. (Ruling on Motion, dated Feb. 6,
2000, para. 7). After the parties rested, the Court issued a
Memorandum Decision on October 11, 2000 and also ordered a
supplementary hearing for October 25, 2000. Appellant failed to
appear at the October 25, 2000 hearing. (Amended Memorandum
Decision, Oct. 25, 2000, page 1, 1st paragraph). The Court then
entered an amended Memorandum Decision and ordered Appellee to
draft Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a Judgment and
Order.
Appellant filed a Motion for Stay of the Order And For New
Trial, Appellee filed an Objection to the motion for a new trial and
Appellant filed a response to Appellee's objection. On February 6,
2001, Judge Bryce K. Bryner issued a ruling on Defendant's Motion
for Stay of Order and Motion for New Trial. Judge Bryner found
Appellant's claim was without merit because Defendant's motion for
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continuance was untimely. Appellant now appeals from Judge
Bryner's ruling on his motion for a new trial.
RELEVANT FACTS
It is difficult, in some ways, to state all of the relevant facts to
the court because neither party obtained a written transcript of the
proceedings before the court. In stating the relevant facts, Appellee
will refer the Court of Appeals to written pleadings, documents,
written decisions of the court and facts referred to in Appellant's
brief even though the facts covered in Appellant's brief do not refer
to any record. The court accepted Appellant's brief, anyway, and
Appellee is now obligated to respond to it.
Appellee is a Utah Corporation in good standing, with its
principal place of business at Price, Carbon County, Utah (para 2,
Verified Complaint dated February 7, 2000). Appellant is a resident
of Carbon County, Utah (para 3, verified complaint). On May 26,
1999, Appellant signed a work order (Exhibit No. 1) that described
repairs that were to be made by Appellee to Defendant's 1964
Chrysler (para 1 of Findings, Memorandum Decision dated October
11, 2000). On September 20, 2000, Appellee prepared an invoice
detailing work performed on Appellant's Chrysler and other
automobiles at Defendant's request. The total cost was $4,854.05
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and Defendant received a credit for $2,500.00 previously paid,
leaving a balance of $2,354.05. Appellant subsequently removed his
automobile from Appellee's premises without paying the bill even
though he had authorized all of the work performed by Appellee
(Findings, page 1, Memorandum Decision dated October 11, 2000).
Appellee filed a complaint on February 7, 2000, seeking
compensation for services and auto parts for automobiles owned by
Defendant (Verified Complaint). On February 17, 2000 Appellant
obtained a subpoena form, partially completed it, and had the Carbon
County Sheriff serve it on Paul Pugliese, (Addendum, #1). The
subpoena did not specify a place, date or time for the appearance of
Paul Pugliese. It wasn't until four months later on June 26, 2000, that
the District Court Judge selected the date of September 7, 2000 as
the date for trial (Ruling on Defendant's Motion for Stay of Order
and Motion for a New Trial, dated February 6, 2001, page 2, para.
1).
On September 7, 2000, when Appellee's attorney, together
with his witnesses appeared for trial together with Appellant, the
Court asked the parties if they were ready to begin the trial.
Appellant informed the Court that he had subpoenaed Paul Pugliese
and that Paul Pugliese was not present. He presented a copy of the

11
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Subpoena and Return to the court, the court heard argument from
both Appellant and counsel for Appellee and denied Appellant's
request for a continuance of the trial so that he could properly
subpoena Paul Pugliese, the owner of the Plaintiff corporation (para
I, Appellee's Objection to Motion for Stay of Order and Motion for
a New Trial, dated November 22, 2000, uncontroverted by
Defendant). The court proceeded with the trial, and heard the sworn
testimony of Appellee's witnesses, the sworn testimony of Appellant,
received exhibits into evidence, heard arguments of counsel for
Appellee and from Appellant, took the matter under advisement and
issued a Memorandum Decision (Memorandum Decision, October
II, 2000, uncontroverted by Defendant). The court ordered a second
hearing, scheduled for October 25, 2000. Counsel for Appellee and
Appellee's office manager appeared on that date but Appellant did
not appear (Amended Memorandum Decision, October 25, 2000).
Appellant then filed his Motion for Stay and Motion for New Trial.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
FIRST

ISSUE:

Appellant failed to issue a valid subpoena,

completely failing to state the place, date and time for the appearance
of Paul Pugliese, (see Subpoena, Addendum #1) and failing to pay
the witness fee required by Rule 45(b)(1)(A), Utah Rules of Civil

12
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Procedure. The court, pursuant to the discretion given it by Rule 4105(3) of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration, denied
Appellant's request for a continuance on the morning of trial so that
he could subpoena Paul Pugliese. The court made its decision based
on the facts that Appellant had from June 26 to September 7, 2000 to
issue a subpoena that included the place, date and time. (Ruling on
Motion for New Trial, dated Feb. 6,2000, page 2, para. 1). Appellant
could have also obtained a subpoena and served Paul Pugliese during
the lunch break on the day of trial and could have subpoenaed Paul
Pugliese to appear at the October 25, 2000 supplemental hearing.
Because Appellee initiated this cause of action by filing a Verified
Complaint, serving Appellant with a Complaint and Summons, the
Appellant filing an Answer to the Complaint, the Appellant was
afforded due process of law and the opportunity to defend himself.
The court's denial of his request, on the morning of trial, for a
continuance was not a denial of Appellant's right of due process of
law.
SECOND ISSUE: Appellant's motion for a new trial, pursuant to
Rule 59(a)(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, did not comply with
the requirements of that Rule. The only "irregularity" referred to by
Appellant was Paul Pugliese's failure to appear on the Appellant's

13

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

defective subpoena which did not specify the place, date and time of
Mr. Pugliese's appearance and was not accompanied by a witness fee
as required by Rule 54(b)(1)(A), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Appellant's failure to follow the rules in serving a subpoena is
not an "irregularity" within the meaning of Rule 59(a)(1), and none
of the other grounds required for the granting of a new trial can be
shown, either. The Trial Court has no discretion to grant a new trial
absent a showing of one of the grounds specified in Rule 59(a).
Appellant has failed to show grounds justifying the Court's granting
of his motion.
THIRD ISSUE: This issue is included only because Appellant lists
it as one of his reasons for his motion for a new trial and for his
appeal. The court correctly determined that Appellant's principle
argument was simply a restatement of his claim that the court's
refusal to grant him a continuance on the morning of trial was a
denial of his right to due process of law. Appellant was not denied
due process of law. In fact Appellee's efforts to recover the money
owed to it began by bringing the entire matter before a court in
which Appellant could respond to Appellee's claims and exercise his
rights to due process of law. The right to due process of law cannot
be forced upon a person, and citizens can only be given the
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opportunity to have due process of law. Appellant was given the
opportunity, chose to exercise his right without the assistance of
competent legal counsel, but still had his day in court. While Mr.
Pugliese did not appear and testify, Appellant appeared, was sworn
and testified, and testified to the purported agreement between
himself and Mr. Pugliese, Appellee's agent. If anything, Appellant
was afforded the opportunity to present his uncontroverted side of
the story without Mr. Pugliese present to rebut his statements.
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT
Appellant's brief includes many arguments, facts and issues,
attempting to get this court to re-try the case. However, there are
only two basic issues in this appeal which the court should address,
(1) was the Trial Court's refusal to enforce Appellant's faulty
subpoena or grant Appellant a continuance to subpoena Paul
Pugliese a denial of due process, and (2) did the court abuse its
discretion in denying Appellant a new trial pursuant to Rule 59(a)(1),
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Request For a Continuance Issue: Section 78-24-5,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, defines what constitutes a subpoena.
For a document to constitute a subpoena, it must (1) be a writ or
order directed to a person, (2) requiring his attendance, (3) at a

15
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particular time and place to testify as a witness. Appellant obtained a
subpoena form from the Seventh Judicial District Court, partially
completed the form and had it served upon Paul Pugliese. However,
the form failed to state the place Mr. Pugliese was to appear, and
failed to state the date and the time of his appearance, and under the
definition of a subpoena contained in the Utah Code, the document
served on Mr. Pugliese was not a subpoena. Appellant, having
chosen to represent himself, should not expect the District Court
Judge to act as his legal counsel and a fortiori, should not expect
counsel for Appellee to act as his legal counsel.
Appellant's purported subpoena failed to comply with the
definition of a subpoena found in Section 78-24-5, Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure and failed to comply with the requirements of Rule
45(a)(1)(C) because it failed to state the place of appearance, the
date and the time. Additionally, Appellant failed to comply with Rule
45(b)(1)(A), because Appellant failed to provide a witness fee to Mr.
Pugliese. Mr. Pugliese was not a party to this action, Tire King, Inc.,
a Utah corporation was the party.
After this counsel filed the Verified Complaint in behalf of
Appellee, Appellant filed an Answer, that was in some ways, nonresponsive to the Complaint. Shortly thereafter, Appellant filed a

16
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Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, without filing the
Motion itself. Counsel for Appellee concluded that Appellant,
representing himself, was unfamiliar with the rules of the court.
During that same time, Appellant served his faulty subpoena
upon Paul Pugliese and in reviewing it, counsel for Appellee
assumed that Appellant was using the document as a Request for
Production of Documents. Shortly thereafter, Appellant delivered a
request for discovery and counsel assumed Appellant served the
subpoena form for discovery purposes, because it didn't otherwise
make any sense.
When the parties appeared for court and Appellant raised the
issue of his subpoena, in a conciliatory frame of mind, this counsel
"apologized" to the court and explained that this counsel did not
realize that Appellant intended for Mr. Pugliese to appear at trial,
since the subpoena was issued many months before a trial date was
even selected. Paul Pugliese did not appear for trial as a witness for
the Plaintiff/Appellee because his presence at Appellee's place of
business is essential to the proper operation of the business.
Appellee's office manager was fully familiar with Appellee's
dealings with Appellant, and was the keeper of the records pertaining
to their transactions. Greg Franklin was the mechanic that provided

17
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much of the labor on Appellant's automobile and was with Appellant
when decisions concerning the engine and transmission were made
(para 5, Amended Memorandum Decision, October 25, 2000). They
appeared at court and testified in behalf of Plaintiff.
Appellant was not harmed by Paul Pugliese's non-appearance.
As recorded in the Court's Memorandum Decision dated October 11,
2000, on the day of trial on September 7, 2000, Appellant was
present and testified, the court received exhibits into evidence, heard
arguments and took the matter under advisement. During the trial, to
assist Appellant, the court greatly relaxed the rules for presenting
evidence, and allowed the Defendant great latitude in presenting his
evidence and arguments, including both when he presented his case
and when he cross examined Plaintiffs witnesses. It is neither fair
nor truthful for Defendant to now accuse the court of undermining
Defendant's case (see para 5 of Appellee's Objection to Motion for
Stay of Order and Motion for Trial dated November 22, 2000). In
Appellee's Objection to Motion for Stay of Order and Motion for
New Trial, Appellee correctly states the facts of what occurred
relating to Appellant's purported subpoena, the court's conduct of
the trial, and the discretion the court exercised in allowing
Appellant's great latitude in presenting this case. The statements in
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Appellee's Objection to Appellant's Motion for Stay and Motion for
New Trial were not rebutted or controverted by Appellant. The court,
in its ruling on Defendant's Motion for Stay of Order and Motion for
New Trial, incorporated the assertions of the facts in Appellee's
Objection to Appellant's Motion for a New Trial, obviously finding
them to be accurate. Dispositive of the issue of whether Appellant
was afforded the opportunity to present his case is the fact that
Appellant testified at great length about the agreement between
himself and Appellant concerning the repair and restoration of his
automobile and thoroughly cross-examined Appellee's witnesses.
Without realizing it, it was to Appellant's advantage to be able to
testify concerning the terms of the agreement in Paul Pugliese's
absence because his testimony was not rebutted by Paul Pugliese.
Appellant was not denied due process of law, but was fully
afforded his right to due process of law because, in Appellee's
efforts to recover moneys owed, Appellee filed an action before the
court, served Appellant notice of the legal action, participated in a
trial with Appellant to which Appellant was given notice, and
Appellant had an opportunity to be heard and to give evidence and
present his defense. That is all that is required. Christiansen v.
Harris, 163 P.2d 314 (1945). For Appellant to be afforded due
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process, neither the court nor opposing counsel is obligated to
prepare Appellant for trial or to try his case for him. He only needs to
be given the opportunity to appear and present his case.
The Denial of a New Trial Issue: Appellant brought his
Motion for Stay of Order and Motion for New Trial pursuant to Rule
59(a)(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The substance of his
grounds for the granting of a new trial was that Paul Pugliese's
failure to appear pursuant to Appellant's purported subpoena and the
court's refusal to grant Appellant a continuance on the morning of
trial constituted an "irregularity". The "irregularity" in this matter
occurred on February 17, 2000, when Appellant obtained a subpoena
form from the District Court, partially completed it, completely
failed to include the place, date and time for which Paul Pugliese
was to appear and failed to attach the witness fee. Then, on the
morning of trial, Appellant asked the court to delay the whole
proceeding because he, alone, had failed to properly prepare his case.
There was no irregularity in the proceedings of the court
within the meaning of Rule 59(a)(1) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
and none of the other grounds stated in Rule 59 apply. The Trial
Court has no discretion to grant a new trial absent a showing of at
least one of the circumstances specified in Subsection (a). Schindler
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v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Even if an
irregularity does exist, the Trial Court has broad discretion to grant
or deny a motion for a new trial. Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817
P.2d 789 (Utah 1991). A Trial Court's ruling on a motion for a new
trial should not be disturbed on appeal except where there is a clear
abuse of the court's discretion. Jensen v. Thomas, 570 P.2d 695
(Utah 1977). The District Court Judge, in his ruling on Defendant's
motion from which Appellant brings this appeal fully explains the
facts upon which he based his decision and adequately demonstrates
that he did not abuse his discretion in denying Appellant's motion for
a new trial.
In Appellant's Motion for Stay of Order and Motion for New
Trial, Appellant, as additional grounds for his motion, also cited
Rule 59(a)(5). In Appellee's Objection to Motion for Stay of Order
and Motion for New Trial, Appellee responds to that argument in
Appellant's Motion in paragraph 7 of Appellee's objection.
Subparagraph 5 requires a showing of "excessive or inadequate
damages, appearing to have been given under the influence of
passion or prejudice". The court did not award any damages in this
case, but awarded the amount due to Plaintiff pursuant to an
agreement between the parties and did not award more than Plaintiff
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asked for in the Complaint. Nothing was awarded to the
Plaintiff/Appellant "under the influence of passion or prejudice".
The court acted in a very reserved and calm manner, listened to all of
the evidence including Defendant's evidence, allowed the Defendant
great latitude in presenting his case and cross-examining Plaintiffs
witnesses and took the matter under advisement before issuing his
decision. Then, the court ordered a second hearing for October 25,
2000 to obtain additional information before rendering a final
judgment. In that hearing, the only "irregularity" was Defendant's
failure to appear at the hearing. (See para 7, Appellee's Objection to
Motion for Stay of Order and Motion for New Trial). In Appellant's
response to the Objection for Motion for Stay and Motion for Trial,
under Objection (D), Appellant acknowledges that "the Plaintiff
interpretation may be right".
CONCLUSION
Appellant failed to issue a subpoena as defined by Section 7824-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, and his purported subpoena,
issued four months before the trial date was even selected, failed to
specify the place, date, and time of appearance of the witness, and
failed to include a witness fee, both required by Rule 45 of Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. He was not entitled to a continuance of the
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trial, and the District Court Judge did not abuse his discretion when
he denied Appellant's request for a continuance of the trial date on
the morning of the trial. The Appellant was not denied his right to
due process of law, because Appellee's efforts to collect the debt
owed to it began with bringing the matter before a court of
competent jurisdiction, serving Appellant with notice of the legal
action, giving Appellant an opportunity to be heard, and to present
his evidence. Although Paul Pugliese did not appear at trial,
Appellant freely testified concerning the terms of the agreement
between the parties, without his testimony being controverted by
Paul Pugliese. The court heard the evidence of all the witnesses, and
issued a Memorandum Decision, ruling in favor of the Plaintiffs for
the amount prayed.
Appellant's Motion for Stay of Order and Motion for New
Trial failed to comply with the requirements of Rule 59(a)(1)
because the motion did not state an "irregularity" within the meaning
of the rule or demonstrate an abuse of discretion. Under Rule
59(a)(5), Appellant's Motion for a New Trial was not supported with
evidence because the court did not award damages and there was no
showing that the award of the amount prayed for was excessive or
due to passion or prejudice. The court does not have discretion to
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grant a new trial absent a showing by the Appellant that one of the
grounds for the granting of a new trial exists. Appellant failed to do
that. The court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant a
new trial and the court's decision should not be disturbed by the
Court of Appeals.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS %!F

DAY OF

JUNE, 2001.
Keith H. Chiara
Attorney for Tire King, Inc.
Plaintiff/Appellee
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ADDENDUM
Subpoena
Memorandum Decision, October 11, 2000
Amended Memorandum Decision, October 25, 2000
Motion for Stay of Order and Motion for New Trial
Objection to Motion for Stay and Motion for New Trial
Response to Objection
Ruling on Motion for Stay and Motion For New Trial
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss
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Name

«

Bar Number

Robert Fly-nn

Address

1265 No carbonvillo rd
City, State ZIP
Price_Ilt_84501____
Telephone
Attorney for the d e f e n d a n t ( P r o

Per)

IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
CARBON COUNTY
Tire king
Plaintiff,

corp,
SUBPOENA

v.
Case No.

Robert Flynn

fi<0G7fi/J/JUD

Defendant.
T0:

—PAUL PUGLICGE
YOU ARE COMMANDED:

OWNER TIRE KING

seventh d i s t r i c t

kr J

to appear in the
the above case.

[ ]

to appear at the place, date and time specified below to testify at the taking o f a deposition in the above case,

Ixl

to

Court at the place, date and time specified below to testify in

Produce or permit inspection and copying of the following documents or objects at the place, date and time
specified below (list documents or objects):

1, Plaintiffs hill to defendant dated 9~2Q-99

.

2. Dates.of payments of transmission to T R I , *
- E( 777 E Main, Price [IT]

•

:

"

—3,The.original verified agreement-o£-defendant with
T i r e King. I n c ( Complaint, iteiji 5)
[ ]

to pennii inspection oT the following premises at the date and time specified below.

PLACE

DATE AND TIME

--":'^Any organization not a party to this suit that is subpoenaed for the taking of a deposition shall designate one or more
;'••'"' ^officers, directors, or managing agents, or other person who consent to testify on its behalf, and may set forth, for each person
cC\. 'designated, the matters on which the person will testify. Rule 30(b)(6), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

i

^ U t 4 . <U?

HATF-

OR ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF/ DEFENDANT

.->•*•}•'''
"->'••-"

In complfanc* wltfitfwAmericans wtih Dfeatffibe* Act,
Individuals needing special •ccommodabons (inducing
communicant akl»«idwrvk«)duHrvlhteprp<»*d«nQ
should call 1400-992-0172, attoastTHREE worWng
days prior toftescheduled oroceedng.
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'W^W
OCT 1 1 2000
IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FCTCSEVENTH DISTRICT UU
fnnRTQ
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
•
UHTS

MEMORANDUM DECISION

TIRE KING INC.,
Plaintiff,
VS.
ROBERT FLYNN,.

Case No. 000700120
Defendant.

Judge Bryce K. Bryner

This matter came on regularly for trial on September 7, 2000. The court heard the sworn
testimony of the parties and their witnesses, received exhibits into evidence, heard the arguments
of counsel, took the matter under advisement, and now issues this memorandum decision.
Plaintiff seeks judgment against the defendant for $2,354.05 for parts, labor, and services
provided to defendant's 1964 Chrysler and two other vehicles, together with accrued interest,
attorney fees, and costs. The defendant contends that the defendant breached the agreement to
repair the Chrysler by performing work that was not authorized.
• From th$ evidence presented the court finds:
1. On May 26, 1999, the defendant signed a work order (Ex. #1) that described repairs that
wqre to be made by plaintiff to defendant's 1964 Chrysler.
2. On September 20, 2000, plaintiff prepared an invoice detailing the work that was
performed on the defendant's Chrysler as well as some work performed at defendant's request on
a Blazer and a Buick. The total cost was $4854.05. The Defendant received a credit for $2,500
previously paid as a deposit, leaving a balance due of $2,354.05.
3. After plaintiff examined the Chrysler engine, it was determined that it should be taken to
Clegg Automotive in Orem for engine work that is normally farmed out by plaintiff. The
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defendant personally transported the engine to Orem and thereby consented to the engine being
removed from the car and the work by Clegg being performed. The plaintiff paid the bill to
Clegg Automotive in the amount of $736.33, and charged the defendant for that expense and
listed it on Ex. #2.
4. The defendant never complained to the plaintiff that the work being performed was not
•":^;./reauthorized.
5. After the engine was returned from Clegg Automotive for a second time and was
reinstalled, the car was started but the transmission linkage would not operate properly and the
transmission remained in reverse. Mr. Greg Franklin, a mechanic with plaintiff, testified that the
defendant told him to remove the transmission. However, the defendant testified that he was not
present when the transmission was removed and that he did not authorize the transmission to be
removed from the car, and he contends he should not be charged $240 for its removal and
installation. In any event, the transmission was then taken to TRI for repairs by the defendant
and Mr. Franklin accompanied him.
The court finds that the defendant authorized the transmission to be removed. Moreover, on
Augusf 10, 1999, at the bottom of Ex #3, the defendant ratified the removal by the instruction he
wrote directing the plaintiff to "include transmission work on my bill until all work is done.
OK?" Ex.#3 was written by the defendant after the transmission had been removed from the car.
6. The court finds that on September 11, 1999, the defendant justifiably removed the
Chrysler from the plaintiffs premises because it had not been worked on for about three weeks.
The courtfindshowever, that the removal of the car prevented the plaintiff from completing
some minor repairs on the car, to wit:finetuning the transmission and the engine, state
inspection, and completing work on the brakes. The courtfindsthat the total amount on Ex. 2
included the cost of performing thatfinalwork, Because it was not performed, the bill is to be
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reduced by the value of the work not completed. The court was not presented with any evidence
from which it could determine the reasonable value of the work that has not yet been performed.
For that reason, the court will conduct a hearing on October 25, 2000, at 1:30 p.m. for the
purpose of taking testimony on the value of the work not completed.
The court declines to make an award of attorney fees in this case for the reason that the
court finds the defense presented by the defendant was brought in good faith. The defendant
presented eleven reasons why the plaintiff should not be awarded the relief requested in the
complaint. The fact that the court has rejected those reasons does not mean the defense was not
- J^

asserted in good faith.

Based on the foregoing, the courtfindsthat the plaintiff should be awarded judgment in the
amount of $2354.05, less the value of the work not completed.
Once the hearing is completed on October 25th, counsel for the plaintiff is directed to
prepare appropriate Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and a Judgment consistent with this
memorandum decision.
DATED this /(.

j.fl
day of October, 2000.

~-*np

e K. Bryner, Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 000700120 by the method and on the date
specified.
METHOD
Mail

Mail

Dated this | \&\ day of

/CSr j-

NAME

' ':'^:

ROBERT FLYNN
DEFENDANT
1265 North Carbonville Rd
Price, UT 84501
KEITH CHIARA
ATTORNEY
i
P.O. BOX 955
PRICE UT 84501

., 20JXL

Deputy Court Clerk
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FILED
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IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH SEVENTH DISTRICT COURTS

TIRE KING INC.,

AMENDED MEMORANDUM
DECISION
Plaintiff,
~'^:M%*

VS.
ROBERT FLYNN,.

Case No. 000700120
Defendant.

Judge Bryce K. Bryner

This matter came on regularly for trial on September 7, 2000. The court heard the sworn
testimony of the parties and their witnesses, received exhibits into evidence, heard the arguments
of counsel, took the matter under advisement, and issued its Memorandum Decision on Oct. 11,
2000. In that decision, the court scheduled another hearing for October 25, 2000, at 1:30 p.m. for
the purpose of considering a credit to be given the defendant which the court found to have not
been completed, but for which the defendant was billed. The court conducted the hearing on the
said date at which time the plaintiff and its attorney were present but the defendant did not
appear. ;
Plaintiff seeks judgment against the defendant for $2,354.05 for parts, labor, and services
provided to defendant's 1964 Chrysler and two other vehicles, together with accrued interest,
attorney fees, and costs. The defendant contends that the defendant breached the agreement to
repair the Chrysler by performing work that was not authorized.
From the evidence presented at the trial and the hearing on October 25, 2000, the court
finds as follows:
1. On May 26, 1999, the defendant signed a work order (Ex. #1) that described repairs that
were to be made by plaintiff to defendant's 1964 Chrysler.
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2. On September 20, 2000, plaintiff prepared an invoice detailing the work that was
performed on the defendant's Chrysler as well as some work performed at defendant's request on
a Blazer and a Buick. The total cost was $4854.05. The Defendant received a credit for $2,500
previously paid as a deposit, leaving a balance due of $2,354.05.
3. After plaintiff examined the Chrysler engine, it was determined that it should be taken to
Clegg Automotive in Orem for engine work that is normally farmed out by plaintiff. The
defendant personally transported the engine to Orem and thereby consented to the engine being
removed from the car and the work by Clegg being performed. The plaintiff paid the bill to
Clegg Automotive in the amount of $736.33, and charged the defendant for that expense and
listed it on Ex. #2.
4. The defendant never complained to the plaintiff that the work being performed was not
authorized.
5. After the engine was returned from Clegg Automotive for a second time and was
reinstalled, the car was started but the transmission linkage would not operate properly and the
transmission remained in reverse. Mr. Greg Franklin, a mechanic with plaintiff, testified that the
defendant fold him to remove the transmission. However, the defendant testified that he was not
present when the transmission was removed and that he did not authorize the transmission to be
removed from the car, and he contends he should not be charged $240 for its removal and
installation. In any event, the transmission was then taken to TRI for repairs by the defendant
and Mr. Franklin accompanied him.
The courtfindsthat the defendant authorized the transmission to be removed. Moreover, on
August 10, 1999, at the bottom of Ex #3, the defendant ratified the removal by the instruction he
wrote directing the plaintiff to "include transmission work on my bill until all work is done.
OK?M Ex.#3 was written by the defendant after the transmission had been removed from the car.
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6. The court finds that on September 11, 1999, the defendant justifiably removed the
Chrysler from the plaintiffs premises because it had not been worked on for about three weeks.
The court finds however, that the removal of the car prevented the plaintiff from completing
some minor repairs on the car, to wit:finetuning the transmission and the engine, state
inspection, and completing work on the brakes. However, the court finds that the total amount
on Ex. 2 did not include the cost of performing thatfinalwork.
The court declines to make an award of attorney fees in this case for the reason that the
court finds the defense presented by the defendant was brought in good faith. The defendant
presented eleven reasons why the plaintiff should not be awarded .the relief requested in the
complaint. The fact that the court has rejected those reasons does not mean the defense was not
asserted in good faith.
Based on the foregoing, the courtfindsthat the plaintiff should be awarded judgment in the
amount of $2354.05, together with costs and pre-judgment and post-judgment interest as
provided for by law.
Counsel for the plaintiff is directed to prepare appropriate Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law, and a Judgment consistent with this Amended Memorandum Decision.
DATED this <&5

day of October, 2000.
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 000700120 by the method and on the date
specified.
METHOD
Mail

Mail
1

Dated this 95

day of /"hf&kejtj

NAME

'' "

ROBERT FLYNN
DEFENDANT
1265 North Carbonville Rd
Price, UT 84501
KEITH CHIARA .
ATTORNEY
'r
P.O. BOX 955
PRICE UT 84501
, 20 /)Q . --

Deputy Court C]<^rk
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#1.

Robert Flyrtn
1265N.Carbonville Rd #92/#24
Price, Utah 84501
Defendant(Pro Per)
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR CARBON COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

Tire King, Inc./
Plaintiff,

MOTION FOR STAY OF ORDER AND
MOTION
Civil

FOR NEW TRIAL
000700120

vs.
Robert Tlynn,
Defendant.

Judge: Bryce K. Bryner
-

The above case has come before the Courts and a Final Judgement
is imma^ant;
Comes nc; the Defendant acting in his own behalf and asks the
Court for a STAY and MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL; Pending any further
ruling:., and appeals.
CIVIL
Under Rule 59(1) :
1. Defendant was not offered a fair trial because a Subpoena
a;Ci.sion ruled on Defend.ant during trial did obstruct or
other wise deny his right to his only named witness, the
".\i aintif f. Thus denial of some Due Process.
a,

Urder discretions therein time should have been offered as
needed to obtain such witness or corrections of subpoena
a harmless error but one denying Due Process,

k#This was unfair to the Defendant, undermines his ability to
present an ,assertive defense against the unfounded dollars
demanded by Plaintiffs and monies for work not done.
c.Opened the door to misrepresenting, in the Courts decision
Memorandum, the Defendants very own words of his "Contention
" ie the Defendant did not say " Plaintiff breached the
agreement to repair the Chrysler by performing work that was
not authorized lf; The Defendant own ANSWER TO COMPLAINT, says
Vhar tRe 'Defendant did say: [Dated Feb 11, 2000]
Plaintiffs failed to provide all and adequate services to
the defendant, misuses of the 2500.00 given, and forfeitures
of all agreements for said goods and Services. Testimony
also underlines this point of view not the Court interpre
-tations. The Court Memorandum appear to concur,
c.l
Digitizeddollars
by the Howard W.is
Hunter
Law Library, J. Reuben Clark
School,knowable
BYU.
Whether such
unauthorized
isLawnot
to the
Machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors. or statements were
Defendant as no bills,
documentations,

CIVIL
Under Rule 59

(5)

**m%

2. The damages assessed to the Defendant are excessive beyond
his ability to even pay.
a. Without the right to assertive defense and his only
witness, Defendant could not rebut the excessive dollars
that were claimed in the bill and adjudged agaist same.
b. While it was true that unauthorized work was done but not
testified to by Plaintiff himself, dollars as to agreement
and contracts were not legally proven by the Plaintiffs,
[The actual .Plaintiff ,was not in Court]
Defendant did have as the Court says written agreements
[Exhibits: #1] but no credits against excessive charges
for unauthorized dollars shown in [Exhibit #8] were
even considered in the Courts decisions (2500.00 was the
limit imposed in May 1999 ) These points are all provable only if the witness for the Defendant can.be
crossexamined. Monies for work not done is a .different "
credit due Defendant. Dollars were not in any agreement
(s) which Plaintiffs offered the court.
Consequently, although a subpoena was turned over to the Clerk
of the Court, and even served and paid for by the " Defend:^t
it was never officiallyrfiled by the Court and dates never
established* which rightly or wrongly did serve. ' to deny the
Defendant in the above case, his due process in full amounts as
prescribed under the UTAH Constitution, Art. I Sec (7).
Dated this 17th day of November, 2000.
DEFENDAN

vP.iJLfo£ rJLp^/
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AFFADAVIT

I BORFBT T FT.YNN do swear

on this day, Nov 17, 2000

That in the above motions asked for that to the best of
my ability turned over to the Court Clerk, on 02-17-00
forms For Subpoena for Plaintiff in the above entitled
case acting on my own behalf,
AS far as I can say it was nevero n offic±all'yffildd on
that day discovered Nov 2000/,
inspecting record*^

J

SIGNED

2 ATTACHMENTS

A. Receipt of service
B. Clerks Receipt
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AFFADAVIT

/\TlM^nivl£ilNX

Carbon County Sheriff!s Office
240 West Main Street
Price, Utah 84501
(435) 636-3251

^

** C O U N T E R

R e c e i p t No -

2000014

R E C E I P T

"'" ^'^fc%

*****

Date - 02-17-00 ; ^ .
/

Amount P a i d - $ 7 . 0 0
Check No - CASH

J

pvT

Payment By - FLYNN, ROBERT

>

' ^ v"^--

D e s c r i p t i o n - SUB

Received By - KOBE, DEBORAH A

>S*V
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Name

• » * ^ * » V «k «

Bar Number

-1

R o b e r t Fly-nro-

Address

1 ?65 No c a r b o n v i l l e rd
City, State ZIP

Price_Ut_!!50L__
Telephone

Attorneyforthe d e f e n d a n t ( P r o P e r )
IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
CARBON COUNTY
T
T i r e king corp,
SUBPOENA
Plaintiff,

Case No.

Robert Flynn

&M70/2&0

Defendant

TO:

PAUL PUGLIEGE
OWNER TIRE KING'
YOU ARE COMMANDED:
seventh d i s t r i c t

^]

to appear in the
the above case.

* • -. * *»
to appear at the place, date and time specified below to testify at the taking of a deposition in the above case.

[ ]
[xl

Court at the place, date and time specified below to testify in

to

produce or permit inspection and copying of the following documents or objects at the place, date and time
specified below (list documents or objects):

1. Plaintiffs hill to defendant dated 9-2Q-99
2, Dates .of payments of tiaubmission to T R I , »
y-%-E- 777 E Main, Price TJT'
3 .The -original verified agreement- -of-defendant with
Tire King, inc ( Complaint, item 5)
[ ]

to permit inspection oT the following premises at the date and time specified below.

PLACE

DATE AND TIME

^ . ^ i : : A n y organization not a party to this suit that is subpoenaed for the taking of a deposition shall designate one or more
T- "'^officers, Jirectpn, or managing agents, or other person who consent to testify on its behalf, and may set forth, for each person
cOv 'designated, the matters on which the person will testify. Rule 30(b)(6), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

^ff<,

<J7

V>dA>^

HATF-

OR ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF/ DEFENDANT

^-•^Xl

:i.

In compliance with tit Americans wtt Dfeattltfes Act
IndvidueJe imtinQ ipedai •ccommodtiiont (inducing
communicative «kfc end services) during Ait proceeding
should caU 1-eoo-9924172, at least THREE worfcing
days priortotie scheduled orooeedng.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I, the undersigned, certify that on the 17th day of
November, 2000, that I mailed a true and correct copy of
',. Motion to Stay with Motion for New Trial, first class
postage prepaid _ to:

CHIARA LAW OFFICES
KEITH CHIARA

r-^js^fc.

98 NORTH 4 00 EAST
PRICE UTAH
84501

"DEFENDANT (PR*) PER)
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UKlbllMAL
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FILED
Keith H. Chiara #0621
98 North 4C0 East
P. O. Box 955
Price, UT 84501
Telephone: (435) 637-7011
Facsimile: (435)636-0138
Attorney for Rebel Bail Bonds

SEVENTH DISTRICT COURTS

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

TIRE KING, INC.,
Plaintiff.

OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR STAY OF
ORDER AND MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

Vs.
ROBERT FLYNN,
Civil No. 000700120
Defendant.
Judge Bryce K. Bryner
COMES Now Plaintiff, by and through its attorney of record, Keith H. Chiara, and objects
to granting of Defendant's Motion for Stay of Order and his Motion for New Trial for the
following reasons:
1. Defendant moves for a new trial pursuant to URCP 59(1). It is assumed he means
URCP 59(a)(1). Defendant claims he was not given a fair trial because he subpoenaed Paul
Pugliese and Paul Pugliese did not appear. He attaches a copy of the subpoena to his motion.
Defendant raised the issue of Paul Pugliese's failure to appear on Defendant's
"subpoena" at the trial. A copy of the "subpoena" was produced and reviewed. The "subpoena"
was incomplete in that it did not give a date for appearance and therefore was clearly deficient.
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2. The subpoena was dated 2-17-00. The trial in this case was not even selected by the
Court until June 26, 2000. more than four (4) months after the date of the "subpoena".
Because no trial had been set and because the subpoena was not dated. Plaintiff treated
the subpoena as a discovery tool, or a Subpoena Duces Tecum and provided Defendant with
those items requested insofar as Plaintiff had them in its possession.
3. At trial, the Court determined that the Defendant's subpoena did not require Mr.
Pugliese to appear on the date of trial. It is not the Court's responsibility to guide the Defendant
through the trial or to act as Defendant's attorney to protect Defendant from his own failings.
4. In Defendant's Motion, under la, Defendant apparently suggests that, during the trial,
when he was informed that he had not properly served Paul Pugliese with a subpoena, the Court
should have recessed and allowed him time to subpoena Paul Pugliese. Plaintiffs complaint was
filed on February 7, 2000. Between that date and the date of trial, on September 7, 2000,
Defendant filed several different motions and other documents requiring Plaintiff to respond in
writing to preserve its claims against Defendant. Defendant had plenty of time to seek the advice
of legal counsel, do research in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, or any other thing he needed
to do in preparation for trial. He had no right, at the time of trial, to expect the Court to recess the
trial, or continue the proceedings until he had properly subpoenaed Paul Pugliese. He requested
the Court allow him to do that, and the Court declined. He is not now entitled to a whole new
trial because he alone failed to properly follow the rules of Court. He claims that he is being
denied his right to due process. However, he is only looking at one side of the issue. If the Court
were to grant his motion for a new trial at this time, solely because of the Defendant's own
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failures, the Court would be denying Plaintiff due process. Certainly Plaintiff is as entitled to due
process of law' as is the Defendant.
5. Under Defendant's paragraph lb. Defendant again claims that the actions of the Court
were unfair to the Defendant, claiming that the Court's ruling undermines the Defendant's ability
to present an assertive defense. The Court did no such thing. The Defendant was free to obtain
competent legal counsel, and he was free to properly prepare. The Defendant alone undermined
his own ability to present his defense. Interestingly, the Court greatly relaxed the rules for
presenting evidence, and allowed the Defendant extremely great latitude in presenting his
evidence and arguments, including when he presented his evidence and when he cross examined
Plaintiffs witnesses. For Defendant to now accuse the Court of undermining Defendant's case is
very unfair to the Court, and is not truthful.
6. In Defendant's paragraph lc, it appears as though Defendant's objection to the Court's
decision is merely that the Defendant views the evidence differently than the Court views it. The
Court is entitled to view the evidence differently from what the Defendant claims the evidence to
be, based upon all of the evidence presented before the Court, including evidence presented by
the Plaintiff. Simply because the Court does not accept the Defendant's representations as to
what the evidence is, does not mean that the Court is wrong and the Defendant is right, and the
Defendant is entitled to have a whole new trial to repeat the same evidence the Court did not
believe during the previous trial. In paragraph lc, the Defendant appears to merely be rearguing
the same things that he argued to the Court during the trial. Having presented his evidence and
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made his arguments once, if the Court does not accept his position, that does not mean that he is
entitled to a new trial under URCP 59.
7. Under paragraph 2 of Defendant's Motion, the Defendant claims he is seeking a new
trial based upon URCP 59(a)(5). In this assertion however, Defendant apparently did not read the
grounds for a new trial that are provided for under Rule 59(a)(5), because the Court did not
award damages in this case, but awarded the amount due to Plaintiff pursuant to an agreement
between the parties for the Plaintiff to provide parts, labor and services and for Defendant to pay
for the parts, labor and services. No damages were awarded. Certainly, nothing was awarded to
the Plaintiff "under the influence of passion or prejudice". If anything, the District Court Judge
acted in a very reserved and calm manner, carefully listened to all of the evidence, allowed the
Defendant great latitude in presenting his case and cross examining the Plaintiffs witnesses, took
the matter under advisement, issued a Memorandum Decision, set a second hearing for October
25, 2000, issued an Amended Memorandum Decision, and ordered judgment in behalf of the
Plaintiff based upon the evidence presented at the trial and subsequent hearing. Interestingly,
although the Defendant was fully informed of the hearing date for the second hearing. Defendant
failed to appear.
8. As with Defendant's paragraph 1, Defendant's paragraph 2 is more re-argument of his
case than statement of legitimate grounds for granting his motion. All of the things that he states
in his paragraph 2 were argued by him before the Court in the September trial and he had the
opportunity to present any other arguments in the October 26th hearing. Defendant was not
denied due process, nor was he treated unfairly, nor did the Court makes its decision based upon
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the influence of passion or prejudice. Defendant has filed this motion simply because he does not
want to pay a legitimate debt that he owes to the Plaintiff. For that reason his motion should be
denied and he should be required to pay Plaintiffs attorneys fees for having to respond to these
motions for a stay of the order and for a new trial.
PLAINTIFF

PRAYS

FOR

AN

ORDER

OF

THE

COURT

DENYING

DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL AND FOR SETTING ASIDE THE
JUDGMENT, SO PLAINTIFF CAN PROCEED, IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW, TO
RECOVER THE DEBT OWED BY DEFENDANT TO THE PLAINTIFF.
DATED

this ^ ^ day of November, 2000.

Keith H. Chiara
Attorney for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

On t h e ^ ^ d d a y of November, 2000, I personally mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Objection to Motion for Stay of Order and Motion for New Trial, postage prepaid to
the following address:

Robert Flynn
1265 No. Carbonville Rd,
#92/#24
Price, Utah 84501

P^U^^^
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Robert Flynn
1265N Carbonville RD. #92/24
Price UT. 84501
DEFENDANT, PRC PER
IN THE.SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COU?T FOR^ CARBON ^ ^ T ^ p I S T R I " T
STATE OF UTAH
TIRE KING INC.,
Plaintiff,

C0URTS

RESPONSE TO THE OBJECTION FOR
MOTION FOR STAY AND MOTION FOR
NEW TRIAL.

VS.

CIVIL:

000700120

ROBERT FLYNN,

JUDGE:

BRYCE K. BRY^ER

Defendant.

Comes now the Defendant and RESPONDS to the Objection for Motions
for the following:
OBJECTIONS) DUE PROCESS DEFINITIONS
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF PARAGRAPHS #1-#4
Plaintiff arguements did mischaracterize Defendants Motion paragraphs wording in #1a-#1c by confusing differing definitions of
Due Process; Defendant was asking for relief because of the
bias and obstruction of Due Process caused by the administrative
discretion within Due Process not necessarily the substantive
parts of Due Process; For example. Under URCP 59a(l) relief is
sought under "abuse of discretion" by the Court. This can stem
from deeper rules such as the Canon 3 (Canon 3B(5)) wherein a
judge shall(must) perform duties without bias or prejudice.
Certainly the Courts are vitally interested in making available
all relevant testimony; Mr Paul Pugliese was a witness to all the
events in the scope of the Defendant's Contention ie breach of
Contract, and their withdrawal as of Sept. 11 1999', to Prevent
Plaintiff's further demands steming from them.
The standards of fairness, one for the Plaintiffs', even iet them
take Court time to obtain yet another witness, should be the same
for all.
These seem to be a hi^ging^ nf J a i m p s s in the
administering the Process, of Due Process. The Defendant objected
to his-not having a witness but was overruled by the Judge.
OBJECTIONS) DID COURT OBSTRUCT DUE PROCESS BY OMISSION?
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF PARAGRAPH #5
Defendant clearly sees that l.omissive acts from the Court Clerk
not filing Defendant's Subpoena for the Record does deny the «"
chanqe of anj overview of the* record byh-fehe Judge } ^ and thus any
memorandum ~£o";correct prior ,bo- opujrti*- a^d_^.Optional; time for
:^ny remedy to the error^e^the {giibpoe-na / prevents or complicates
theDq^^^iants posdtig^ ^n^ ^ y b e ther^ qqi^p^^i^OT-^.is plans for
presehtin^h^
have teen'del^eirate, or *rfot
and obstructive, "or not. The' outcome their is '"biased. J?ef ore trial
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OBJECTION(C)• THE DEFENDANT CONTENTION
RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF PARAGRAPH #6
The Defendant clearly stated his position in his Motion,
paragraph #1c that he was NOT refering to the "evidence" as it
pertains to the ideas of "contention", but instead to the words
only in the ANSWER TO ..COMPLAINT. Court had no right to argue
backwards from Plaintiff's arguements on "unapproved" issues,
to Defendant's c o n t e n t i o n r on Breach of Contract f o r failure to
deliver' under the agreements. Two separate ideas. In fact the
substituting of Plaintiff's contention into Defendants is highly
irregular and should not be permitted. T h i s i s a b i a s t o d o this.
Contention is what is to be proved, not anything else.
The Courts Memorandum-of Decision should accurately start off at
where the Defendant started and analyze his arguement against the
Plaintiff's, not just substitute one for the other ,4?Hi§cyr§|§ly.
Of course the Defendants witness and assertive defense was
blocked by the unfair ruling to permit Defendant's Subpoena...
OBJECTION(D):
URCP .59a{ 5) ...DAMAGES
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF"POINTS
The Plaintiff interpretation may be right.
Defendant read the rule using "generic"
ie "costs/expenses".

meanings0?f-"damages"

If this be wrong the Defendant respectfully asks the Court to
delete from his Motion For Stay and New Trial, paragraphs that
pertain to justifications under URCP 59a(5), and leave intact
those pertaining ot URCP 59a(1).
SUMMARY OF DEFENDANTS RESPONSE
Plaintiff is refusing to allow his client, Mr. Paul Pugliese, to
testify as Defendant's witness even though the Court knows
this denies Defendant's Due Process. A Problem that must.be
rectified by this Court^ecause there was an administrative bias to fairness, and o m i s s i o n s ^ £hfe]?(our£ ^ h ^ w ^ r e ^ s f i r e t i o n
-ai on the part of the court.
q . . n r . „ i o n n f evidence is not
knew or could given the situation.Supression ot evidence is not
correct, and would be grounds for a new trial.
Dated This 4th Day of December, 2000.
DEFENDANT:
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I the undersigned, certify that on the 4th day of
December, 2000, that I mailed a true and correct
copy of The Response to Objections To Motions to
Stay and Motion For New Trial, first class
postage prepaid, to:
CHIARA LAW OFFICES
KEITH CHIARA
98 NORTH 400 EAST
price Utah 84501
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IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR I
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
TIRE KING INC.,
Plaintiff,

SEVt/VTHDlSrRlcT
jCOUmVCARBON

RULING ON DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR STAY OF ORDER
AND MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

VS.
ROBERT FLYNN,.

Case No. 000700120
Defendant.

Judge Bryce K. Bryner

Trial in this matter was held on September 7, 2000. The court took the case under
advisement and issued its Amended Memorandum Decision on October 25, 2000. The plaintiff
prepared proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a proposed Judgment and
Order and mailed copies to the defendant. The defendant timelyfileda pro se Motionfor Stay of
Order and Motion for New Trial, to which the plaintifffiledan Objection and the defendant filed
a Response. A Notice to Submit for Decision has beenfiledand the court now issues this ruling.
The defendant's motion claims:
1. That he was denied a fair trial because the court refused on the day of trial to continue
the trial to allow the defendant to subpoena a witness, thereby denying him his right to due
process.
2. That the damages awarded to the plaintiff are beyond the ability of the defendant to pay.

I. Was the Defendant Denied a Fair Trial and Due Process?
Under Rule 59 (a) (1) URCP, a new trial may be ordered if either party was prevented from
having a fair trial by an irregularity in the proceedings of the court or an abuse of discretion by
the court. The defendant claims that the court abused its discretion by refusing to allow the
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defendant a continuance to subpoena a witness, Mr. Paul Pugliese.
The court finds that the claim is without merit because the defendant's motion for a
continuance was untimely. The defendant made the motion during the second day of trial on
September 7, 2000. The defendant had previously served a subpoena on Mr. Pugliese on
February 18, 2000, which was four months before the case was set for trial pursuant to a Ruling
dated June 26, 2000. The defective subpoena therefore could not and did not specify a date and
time for Mr. Pugliese to appear. The courtfindsthat there was adequate time between the date of
setting the trial (June 26, 2000) and the date of the trial (September 7, 2000) to issue a new
subpoena with the proper date and time inserted. The defendant has presented no valid reason
why a new subpoena could not have been timely served to obtain the presence of Mr. Pugliese.
To have granted a continuance at that stage of the proceedings would have prejudiced the
plaintiff by causing him to incur additional delay and would have caused him to incur additional
attorney fees. The court therefore finds that the refusal of the court to grant a continuance was
neither an irregularity in the proceedings nor was it an abuse of discretion that prevented the
defendant from having a fair trial nor did it deprive him of due process of law.

IL Defendant's Allegation That the Damages are Beyond his Ability to Pay
The defendant alleges that "[T]he damages assessed to the Defendant are excessive beyond
his ability to even pay." In support thereof he claims; (1) that he could not rebut the amount of
the bill because he was deprived of therightto examine Mr. Paul Pugliese as a result of the court
not allowing a continuance; and (2) unauthorized work was performed on defendant's
automobile but could not be proved without the testimony of Mr. Pugliese.
The court finds that this argument is essentially the same argument presented in the
defendant's first claim, i.e., that the defendant was deprived of the right to examine a witness
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when the court refused to grant a continuance. For the reasons set forth in Section I above, the
court finds that the defendant's claim is without merit.
Based on the foregoing, the courtfindsthat there was no irregularity in the proceedings of
the court which prevented the defendant from having a fair trial. Accordingly, the motion for a
stay of proceedings and the motion for a new trial are denied.
DATED this ^=> day of February, 2001.
i^$?---

ryce K. Bryner
District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 000700120 by the method and on the date
specified.
METHOD

NAME

Mail

ROBERT FLYNN
DEFENDANT
1265 North Carbonville Rd
: #92/24
,
Price, UT 84501
Mail
KEITH CHIARA
ATTORNEY
P.O. BOX 955
PRICE UT 84501
Dated this ?**> day of

-=? J r

, 20jVi_.

Deputy Court Clerk
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ROBERT I FLYNN
DEFENDANT, (PRO PER)
1265 No Carbonville RD
#92 Price UT 84501

**£*.

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR CARBON
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

Tire King Inc.
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF DEFENDANT, ROBERT
FLYNN"S MOTION TO DISMISS
*",'-*

"*mammmmmmmm~*

'

""

"*"

vs.
Civil No.
Robert Flynn

. _ . [

.

: V - :>r. ••

Defendant#

000700120

: *

Defendant Robert Flynn submits the following recent facts
in support of a motion to dismiss.
•

'•
•

/

STATEMENT OF FACTS
•

'

•

•

'

'

•

•

1. Plaintiff Tire King had no written agreement with
Defendant Robert Flynn in the form of and in the
totals ( and contents) as submitted to Defendant
and dated Sept. 20 1999. .
2. Affidavit of complaint to Defendant on above case
000700120 items # 4-8 are singly and solely based
on this submitted agreement. (Defendant's Exhibit B)
3. Defendant had work done from June 20 1999 to August
1999 before the September dated document submitted.
No signature is on the submitted agreement submitted
purporting to be Defendants agreement in June 1999.
4. Exhibit C for Defendant shows when Defendant left Tire
King.
5. Plaintiffs would not negotiate in good faith this
agreements validity with Defendant and in the complaint are
Digitized in
by the bad
Howard W.
Hunter Law
Library,
J. Reuben
Clark Law School, BYU.
acting
faith
to
this
Court.
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DEFENDANTS ARGUEMENT

••**?

ICertain facts came to light on or about February
to Defendant February 15 2000 which defined the
specific dates for when one of the "agreements"[$767.23]
totals, the transmissions repair at TRI, which
showed this date to be October 1 1999 which is
after the dated "agreement" submitted to Defendant
purporting to be the original agreement.
2Attached is Defendants(Exhibit D)signed by the TRI
manager showing he agreed with the statements typed
therein as to 1. dates, 2 separated agreement of
Defendant to pay the monies to TRI later, not to
Plaintiff, at any time from June through August 1999,
3 Thus

the contents j,n the complaint affidavit's submitted to
Seventh District Court of Utah is invalid as to its
specific money relative to this one item, its dates,
and its relavance £o the purported agreement Defendant
actually made with Tire King on or about June 20 1999.

Tne Plaintiffs knowing these facts, did not disclose the
nature of the facts and deliberately hid the facts from
affidavit of complaint, (allow its submission. )
A Copy of the letter from Defendant to Plaintiff ( and
hi's attorney ) attempted on September 27 1999 to act in
'good faith to this Court, disclosing the facts to the
Plaintiffs but was in writing told not to communicate.
( EXHIBIT E; of Defendant).
The defendant swears this is not representative of any
document he had ever seen before and then could not be
legally his document, and asks the Seventh District
Court to DISMISS because of the bad faiths of Plaintiffs
relative to their complaint's forms and contents.

Dated this

22nd day of February, 2000
ROBERT FLYNN(PRO PER)

(fcrUA F£^p^y
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EXHIBIT D
DEFENDANT
ROBERT FLYNN

DAVE JOHNSON;

Dave;

I need, the following written statements of fact only pertaining to the state of work on my 64 chrys^ at Tire
King which your company did the rebuild of trans in Aug
99. If I can get this in a brief writen form signed by
you then I wont need to bring anyone into court to tell
the facts to the court. The note will work..

NEED

Dateand payment

1;

$$

Tire king made to you on car

The date and fact of transmission when Rick -•
looked at it to see if he could fix it there.
The "(statement or fact that you and I spoke on the
phone to get money paid, and that I said at least
in sum and substance that I did not want to pay
for the trans work at that time .

8/(3
Robert Flynn

ph

637-2755
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ROBERT FLYNN
SEPT 29 T99 c .
FUR i KulitlKT FLYNN
TUi

LAW OFFICES
K. CHIAHA

REi

CHARGES

OF lLii.GALHi'

TIKE KING U1LLS

Dear

K.

Chiara

As far as ] knew or know I made NO legal arrangements with TIRE.
KING CO. at any time to allow accruing (OWED) CHARGES to be
put on my CHRYSLER 300 auto. In fact 1 had with TK (PAUL)
an informal, friendship based, personal arrangements to leave my
car at my request at his place, do work on a
KAY AS VUU GO BASIS for which*» was paid up front as required
by TK for any and all of his expenses. Work was to be then
completed by TK. The car was NUT to be encumbered in the process.
Ik failed to live up to its arrangements as per above, yet I was
paid up (2500.00$$) at the time 1 elected under our arrangement
to leave Ik and finish up the work he did not complete, at home.

ere was ScO0.00(a&reed, less UO.OOadv., less 0300.00$ held •
}M
.
Paul was obligated under this verbal agreement to inform me of
1

any extra ordinary expenses incurred, at which t.me I would
re-imbuse him the $$. At the time 1 elected to take ray car hime
1.

He had not spoken to mo of anything as such owed

2.

He had not completed his agreed work

3.

He' had NO iiILL from whic' to Judge, anything
or hold my vehicle for a bill not paid kind of
arrangement.

4.

The bill you sent me was done after the fact(of my
knowledge)

1 do not think it would be illegal unoer our special arrangements
to do what 1 did.
The bill you sent me has invalid items on it 1 do not o*e
for vaiious reasons you are not aware of 1 I have done nothing
imprope: , or that a prudent person >.oui<i not do when
confronted with a three month delay of work by TK, incomplete
and faultyi
1 agree to certain items on the bill, and disagree
with others, and this is Pauls fault for not being accurate in
own assessments of neeued woxki He it not tellinfcutbe/.fciuth in
his Dill and so it would be best decided before a judge,-where
he has to tell the truth.
4800.00$ to rei/uild an engine and
Frausnlsfiqipianci partly install these is not an accurate cost.
Our informal airangements agreed to at most 3100.00$ total I 6 H ' ^ )
but son*? of this was lobt by Pauls own careless methods.
Sincerely
CC

Robert 1 Flynn.

fUu^x

^ p "

Tire King Headquarters.
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